| Navy Resignation Letters |
I can not guarantee the authenticity of these letters, but a person claiming to be a Naval Officer sent me the following two resignation letters. He sent them from an email ending in navy.mil, also stating this in his email: I dig the website. Attached are mine and a friend's letter. I'm Here are the letters: Reasons for Resignation ICO LT KARL x. Bxxxx, USNR I intend to resign from the Navy in order to start a civilian career. I am currently inquiring about employment opportunities. Concurrently, I intend to return to college and complete my master's degree as my working schedule allows. I intend to resign from the Navy because I do not enjoy or derive satisfaction from my work. I believe that the Navy culture is flawed in many ways. The most significant problem I see is our continual use of negative leadership. Rarely if ever do I hear an officer complimented on an outstanding job. It is expected that we perform to perfection, and only the deviations from that are noticed and commented upon. I frequently hear negative comments from all levels of my chain of command towards other officers. Despite all our accomplishments, we don't even receive basic respect as professionals from one another. While on the boat, very long hours are normal even while in port. Department heads would average over 70 hours per week even when nothing special was happening. At shore duty, I average 60 hours per week. Part of the problem is that we seem to create work for ourselves. We frequently go beyond the requirements, or volunteer for additions tasks. If you do not spend excessive amounts of time at work, you are looked upon as a poor performer that doesn't care about his job. The Navy does not appear to care about our quality of life in this aspect. We are well paid for our service, but since we are not paid hourly, the Navy does not care how long you work, as long as the job gets done. I am the only person that values my time. A problem that is exacerbated by being stationed in Japan is how the Navy handles personal responsibility. We are in charge of warships and hundreds of lives, but we have to be told what we can and can't do on liberty. We are told where to go, what to wear, and when to be back. Due to the political sensitivity, I understand using the easy solution of creating more rules and restricting behavior. Since I can offer no better solution, I can't say that it is the wrong way to handle the situation; however, I don't enjoy being treated as a child and I will enjoy the greater freedom and personal accountability that goes along with adult life outside the Navy. I disagree with how the Navy manages their personnel, particularly submarine JO's. I may very likely be separated from the Navy due to my poor physical fitness. At the same time, detailers threaten that if JO's currently on contract do not sign up for SOAC, they will be sent to Iraq. My first problem is that I do not see how my fitness level is relevant to my job. I am paid to make intelligent decisions. Nothing in my six years of service has ever been physically challenging (excepting of course the physical readiness test). Even though it has no bearing on my actual job performance, the Navy is ready to fire me over the issue. On the other hand, we threaten people that we will send them into a combat zone if they do not extend their commitment. We all understand and accept the fact that in the military we may be called into combat. That doesn't make it right to use it as a threat to bludgeon people into an extended contract they don't want. Finally, command of a warship holds no appeal for me. From my observations aboard my boat, the captain was rarely in charge. Even at the peak of naval service, he was still subject to micromanagement from his superiors. There was an atmosphere that any mistake on his part would result in the end of his career. He didn't appear to enjoy his job, and talking with the department heads, they certainly didn't enjoy theirs. Almost every department head that I've talked to has told all junior officers that continuing on as a department head was not worth it. They have no life outside work and receive nothing but negative leadership. Their family and personal lives all suffered to support the needs of the job. I would like to explore my career options and find something that is more personally and professionally rewarding. I will always remember the lessons that I've learned in the Navy, positive and negative. It has helped me grow professionally and as a person. Unfortunately, with the current culture within the Navy, I no longer desire to be part of this organization. ---------------------------------------------------------------
Reasons for Resignation ICO LT xxxx x. xxxx, USNR My decision to resign is based primarily on my experiences with the quality of leadership. I believe that poor leadership is, in fact, the source of much of the discontent that I see in most of my peers. But it is not simply an issue of an unpleasant encounter with one or several individuals. Instead, I believe my experiences and observations are evidence of a leadership culture that is fundamentally flawed. In both my collegiate education and in my own further study of management theory, the basic leadership principle that I have encountered time and time again is that people are motivated best by positive reinforcement. Contemporary psychology has shown in experiments that treating individuals with sincere praise and encouragement reinforces and develops desirable behavior at the actual expense of unwanted behavior. The Navy’s method of leadership, however, is fundamentally based upon negative reinforcement. At every turn, behavioral change is attempted through criticism and punishment. As a junior officer first starting to monitor maintenance practices on my submarine, I was instructed by my Department Head to omit positive comments since they “provided no value.” Upon completion of a period of casualty drills, the Chief of the Boat would debrief the crew on only the errors and mistakes they had made, explaining that improvement could only be made by calling attention to what had been done wrong. Even official evaluations – such as Operational Reactor Safeguard Examinations (ORSE) or Tactical Readiness Evaluations (TRE) – report their findings as a detailed list of deficiencies. In the absence of negative comments, a simple disclaimer is made: “No deficiencies noted.” Seldom is feedback provided highlighting what was done correctly or how to correct the deficiencies that were observed, and any such feedback is off the record. This is not to say that a system of positive reinforcement does not exist. It does - primarily through the presentation of medals and ribbons. Regrettably, it is often poorly executed. Ironically, I also find that, instead of being a source of motivation, it tends to simply engender more disgruntlement. The awarding of medals and ribbons is predominantly a process of habit and routine. The majority of them are given upon completion of a tour of duty or at the end of an overseas deployment. Instead of calling attention to specific individual achievements, the receipt of an award at some periodic juncture becomes expected. Of the nine medals and ribbons I have received thus far, four are for deploying, one is for completing a three-year sea tour, one is for being stationed overseas, one is for being in the Navy on 11 September 2001, and one is for being in the Navy during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Only my Battle E, I feel, acknowledges any sort of specific accomplishment even though it is not a personal award. When awards are presented for specific accomplishments, they are generally issued weeks, or even months, after the event. As a result, the significance of the event has faded from memory and the impact of the award is significantly lessened. On one memorable occasion, an individual on my submarine was presented a personal medal in the interim between his Executive Officer Instruction (XOI) and Captain’s Mast. The predominance of negative leadership and lack of recognition is compounded with decision-making that is frequently but unnecessarily made at the expense of the individual. Personal time is readily sacrificed to meet deadlines of questionable urgency. Additional man-hours are frequently demanded with no apparent assessment of the existing workload or the impact on personnel. Free time, weekends, and holidays are routinely lost without compensation even when there would be little or no cost in doing so. As we neared the end of my first deployment, our ship was given the option of either pulling into Limassol, Cyprus for liberty or proceeding directly to our next port to participate in the Submarine Birthday Ball and get an early start on our end-of-deployment upkeep. Since we had just completed a lengthy mission, had had all but one of our liberty ports cancelled thus far, and had a high operational tempo overall, the crew chose to visit Limassol. In the end, we were sent directly to upkeep without any further explanation. We did, however, stop briefly in Limassol harbor to embark our homeport squadron Commodore for a ride opportunity. Cyprus ended up being our last opportunity for a liberty port as our final remaining port after the upkeep was also cancelled. The growth in workload and loss of personal time is exacerbated in the execution of quality control and process improvement. “Root cause” analysis generally places blame for mishaps and incidents at the lowest level of the chain-of-command. As a result, the typical solution is to increase supervisory involvement and procedural complexity. Duplication of effort escalates as equivalent levels of the chain-of-command independently implement procedures to satisfy ever-increasing requirements. The actual cause of the problem may not even be corrected if blame was originally misplaced. Shortly after arriving on my submarine, I was involved in an incident in which a shore facility violated procedure while performing maintenance on our equipment and disabled an important protective feature. With direction by our parent squadron, the final incident report identified the root cause as the ship’s failure to identify the shore facility’s mistake. Though I do not deny the responsibility in verifying the condition of a piece of equipment after having been altered by an outside command, I find it deeply disturbing that the procedural violation was mentioned nowhere in the report. As far as I can tell, there was no formal process of upgrading the shore facility and no sharing of lessons learned with other units. Since the root cause of the incident had been officially attributed solely to the ship, procedures were implemented locally to prevent further incidents, but no action was taken to prevent the same thing from occurring elsewhere. Instead of processes improving, they tend to evolve into exhaustively detailed procedures with excessive levels of supervisory review, so much so that independent thought or common sense becomes jeopardized. The lower levels of the chain-of-command, whose work is constantly double or triple-checked, become disengaged and mechanical followers of procedure, resulting in actual degradation in the quality of their product. The higher levels of the chain-of-command become overworked and unable to focus on the big picture as they take an increasingly hands-on role in reviewing, correcting, and completing work. Though overall quality may improve, it is through brute force vice process improvement and at an enormous cost in man-hours. Attempting to reduce one’s workload by working harder and more efficiently tends to cause the opposite. Hard workers are typically inundated with tasks while poor performers are often allowed to sit idle without any apparent consequence. It often seems that individuals who turn out a poor product, miss deadlines, or just simply do not make an effort will eventually cease to be tasked. Instead the onus falls upon those that are already putting in a significant effort. In the end, while one group of individuals is overloaded and working excessive hours to complete a job, another group contributes minimal effort and provides little to no productivity. From New Year’s Day I have worked 7 out of 8 weekends, having stood duty 5 times and been called into work twice. Yet as I stand duty and work weekends in addition to my normal staff job, I sit next to 5 officers who are on their third and fourth month of qualifications, even though the watch station only has a two month qualification date and their sole responsibility is to qualify and stand watch. These individuals have no assigned staff job, spend the majority of the day sitting around the office, and have the majority of their weekends and holidays off. Despite their delinquency, there seems to be little urgency by the Senior Watch Officer or the Chain of Command to get them qualified even though they provide little to no productivity and constitute an enormous waste of manpower. The confluence of all these factors devastates morale. On multiple occasions I have witnessed motivated, career-minded individuals become defeated and embittered from the leadership practices I have described. Though there is a strong work ethic, sense of camaraderie, and willingness to serve among most of my coworkers, underlying it all is deep-seated frustration and anger. I have watched some of the best Chief Petty Officers with whom I have worked grow enraged with incessant micromanagement and questioning of their judgment as their workers sat and waited to commence work. One had become so angry and frustrated with the leadership that, after 20 years of service, he retired without any type of ceremony. My reasons for becoming a submariner were simple: I thought that submarines were “cool”, and I thought that working on one would be fun and rewarding. My feelings on the matter have not changed – submarines continue to hold the same fascination for me now as they did when I was young. This is not to say that I did not anticipate hard work or expect demands on my personal time. But I did expect that such sacrifices would be made with due consideration from the leadership and, if not compensated, then at least acknowledged. All to often I feel as if my personal life outside of work is regarded as a triviality that can be taken away on a whim. My time in the Navy has, if nothing else, been rich with unique experiences and opportunities. I have learned a great deal in areas and fields I may not have otherwise pursued, have had the chance to visit a number of foreign countries and live in one of them, and feel I have grown and developed as an individual in many ways. I do not doubt that the Navy would continue to offer unique opportunities that I will not find elsewhere. But after 5½ years, I ultimately do not find my work particularly fun or rewarding. This, I believe, is the one reason why anyone should elect to pursue a career in any particular field. In the absence of it, I feel one must continue on and see what other things life holds in store. For me, that time has come.
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